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Abstract
Ethnicity is an important institution and one that impacts on the quality of
governance. This paper focuses on the behavior of ethnic groups and specifically
on their impact on the provision of public goods. The paper shows that ethnic
heterogeneity results in under-provision of non-excludable public goods. On the
other hand, such societies associate with provision of patronage goods. The paper
proposes some areas of research such the economics of ethnic institutions, empir-
ical evidence of the role ethnic groups on public goods provision, tax compliance
and institutional reforms to improve governance.
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I.  Introduction 
One of the legitimate functions of government is the provision of public goods.2 This is particularly so 
in the case of pure public goods-- defined as those that are non-excludable, non-rival and indivisible in 
production and consumption. These conditions result in a situation where the market fails to provide 
the goods efficiently and in sufficient quantities. Non-excludability implies that limiting access to a 
good or service is difficult or can be extremely costly and therefore private provision is not feasible 
because of the free-rider problem. Left to the market, such goods will either not be produced at all or 
will be under-provided. The non-rival characteristic of public goods implies that the consumption by 
one consumer does not reduce the quantity available to other consumers. Thus, the marginal cost of 
providing the good to another consumer is zero.  The fact that production and consumption of a 
public good are indivisible implies that the good cannot be divided up and sold. Even if such goods 
were excludable, private provision would be inefficient since firms would charge positive prices. 
Governments also provide what are called impure or quasi public goods. These are goods that are only 
partially rival or partially excludable.  While such goods could be provided by the private markets, the 
levels may not be efficient. By and large, markets will tend to produce those commodities with public 
goods characteristics in inefficiently small quantities.3   
 The standard assumption is that when government steps into correct for market failure, it does so 
with the intention of maximizing social welfare and does so efficiently. Nevertheless, government 
provision is itself marred by numerous inefficiencies and shortcomings--what is referred to as 
government failure (Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Olson (1965).  A particularly important explanation 
                                                 
2 Other reasons for government intervention include the existence of positive and negative externalities; income 
distribution and regulation of business firms where competition is not feasible. In some cases, governments 
engage in provision of what are referred to as "merit" goods. 
3 When such goods are provided by the market, government intervention in form of regulation is often essential. 
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for government failure is provided by the interest-group theory of government. The interest-group 
theory of government posits that public policy makers are not benevolent maximizers of social welfare 
as assumed by the market failure model but are instead motivated by self interests. In particular, policy 
makers seek to maximize their well-being and engage in wealth transfers in order to buy political 
support. Thus, well-organised redistributive coalitions advance narrow interests against a backdrop of 
mass “rational ignorance”. This means that the political allocation that replaces market allocation is 
itself not efficient. In addition, public provision is subject to rent-seeking which associates with waste 
of resources and other inefficiencies (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1975).  Other factors that explain the 
inefficiencies of government provision focus on the principal agent problems inherent in public 
provision. The principal agent problems arise form the fact that voters are not motivated to invest 
resources to monitor the behavior of public officials.  One the one hand, public provision lacks well-
defined property rights because voters are numerous and dispersed. No single individual has sufficient 
wealth at stake to make it worthwhile to monitor government officials on a day-to-day basis. 
Furthermore, the government output is often difficult to measure relative to inputs. Public employees 
therefore have a great deal of discretion that they exploit to advance own interest at expense of the 
general public (Shughart and Kimenyi 1991). All these factors undermine the quality of public 
provision.  Because of weaker institutions of governance, these problems are more pronounced in 
poor countries. 
 A growing body of research shows that one factor influencing the quality of governance in the 
provision of public goods is the degree of ethnic fractionalization. In other words, other things equal, 
government failure associated with collective provision is more serious in societies that are more 
heterogeneous than those that are homogeneous. One way that ethnicity could increase the probability 
of government failure is by increasing the transaction costs of achieving cooperation and thus 
weakening institutions of governance. The literature further shows that the failure to take 
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heterogeneity in the design of institutions has contributed to governance failures in countries with high 
degrees of ethnic fractionalization. Thus, by ignoring the importance of ethnicity in institutional 
design, many ethnically fractionalized developing countries are not suited to harmonize ethnic claims 
(Kimenyi 1998). Given the high degree of ethnic fractionalization in Africa, it is conceivable that this 
could be one of the reasons for poor governance in the continent. The basic premise of this paper is 
that ethnicity is an important institution and one that influences public policy outcomes. The paper is 
in the spirit of new institutional economics and basically considers ethnic groups as units of collective 
choice. On the one hand, ethnic groups complicate collective action translating into outcomes that 
make all members of the society worse off. On the other hand, ethnic units lower the transaction costs 
of solving prisoners dilemma problems and thus are suited to provide local public goods. 
 This paper is about how ethnicity impacts on governance in the provision of public goods. If in 
fact ethnicity does impact on the quality of governance, then such should impact on the quality and 
other dimensions of public provision. In the next section, the paper reviews the literature that links 
ethnicity to governance. Section III focuses more specifically on the impact of ethnic fractionalization 
on the provision of public goods and provides relevant examples in Africa. Section IV concludes with 
a discussion of policy implications and proposal for research agenda.  
 
II. Ethnicity, Governance and Collective Action 
An increasing number of studies suggest that there is a link between ethnicity and economic outcomes.  
A comprehensive study on ethnicity and governance by Horowitz (1985) provides an in-depth analysis 
of ethnicity and institutions in a wide range of countries and basically concludes that ethnicity is an 
important institution and one that  is responsible for many outcomes observed in those societies. 
Horowitz also presents some proposals for institutional design that takes ethnicity into. Other authors 
have come to similar conclusions in terms of the importance of ethnicity as an institution. For 
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example, some of the recent studies on ethnicity and institutions find that ethnically diverse societies 
are prone to corruption and poor governance, conflict and slow economic growth (Kimenyi 1987; 
Easterly and Lavine 1997; Mauro 1995; Mbaku, Ogbese and Kimenyi 2001; Kimenyi 1997).  
Considering the high degree of ethnic fractionalization in Africa, an understanding of how ethnic 
institutions impacts on collective action is crucial. This section focuses on the behavior of ethnic 
groups that could impact on collective provision. 
One of the most striking features of African countries is the degree of ethnic heterogeneity. 
Sub-Saharan African countries are home to over 2,000 distinct ethnic groups that are characterized by 
different language, culture and traditions. The size of the ethnic groups varies from millions of people 
to a few hundred thousands.  Heterogeneity in Africa is magnified by the wide range of religious 
beliefs. Another important feature of the African societies is that ethnic groups associate with a 
particular territory —what is referred to as geo-ethnicity. By and large, ethnic groups have what they 
consider to be their territory.  Cobbach (1988) observes that:  
In Africa, this ethnic identity is above all other things a territorial identity.  Nothing defines 
the ethnic group better than its ‘standing place’. Thus the term geoethnicity has been used to 
describe the African ethnic phenomenon. Geoethincity as opposed to non-territorial ethnic 
identification involves the historic identification of an ethnic group with a given territory, an 
attachment to a particular place, a sense of place as a symbol of being and identity (p. 73) 
 
Thus, by and large, ethnic units make up what could be called "ethnic nations.” Geo-ethnicity 
implies that provision of public goods in a particular area primarily benefits members of a distinct 
group. This will be true for most spatial public goods. 
An important fact is that in Africa, individuals tend to associate strongly with members of 
their ethnic groups.  Ethnic groups have through the years continued to remain distinct with members 
identifying strongly with their ethnic group. By and large, identifying with ones ethnic group is highly 
valued and resources are devoted to make certain that members of a group continue to identify with 
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that group. Children are taught to identify and be proud of their tribe and ethnic identity is strongly felt 
and behavior based on ethnicity is normatively sanctioned (Horowitz 1985).  Through this 
identification process, groups adopt various customs, beliefs and ways of doing things all which tend 
to bide the members of the group and separate them from others. More trust is nurtured amongst 
members of the group and in essence, members of an ethnic groups see themselves as different from 
others. 
 One of the explanations why ethnicity may impact on economic and other outcomes is simply 
that there are systematic differences in preferences and endowments across ethnic groups. For 
example, it is conceivable that preferences for a particular public good vary across different groups. If 
this were the case, then it can be expected that there would be differences in the desired levels and mix 
of public goods. Systematic differences in preferences could arise from history, custom and geography. 
However, the most credible explanation as to why ethnicity may impact on collective provision is 
through its effect on governance. 
 Unlike private provision, collective provision is associated with numerous governance 
challenges. A particular governance problem in public provision is coordination. Collective action 
involves various forms of transaction costs related to cooperation—that is costs of bringing people 
together to cooperate in organizing for the provision of a good including payment of taxes. Good 
governance in the provision of public goods therefore requires an institutional framework that reduces 
the costs of cooperation. Such an institutional framework could be supplied by experience built up 
through repeated interactions, a high level of social cohesion, trust or a constitutional and legal regime 
characterized by effectiveness and legitimacy (Meagher 2003). In essence, where interests are 
encompassing amongst the members of a society, transaction costs of achieving cooperation is low and 
collective action is enhanced. Thus, improvements in public provision require institutions that reduce 
the transaction costs of cooperation. 
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 The insight by Mucur Olson (1989) on roving and stationary bandits is particularly relevant. 
Traditional Chinese villages were ruled by two types of bandits. The first was a group of bandits that 
moved from village to village robbing and looting the produce from the farmers. Different groups of 
bandits would separately loot the villages in a disorganized manner. These roving bandits had not 
interest on the well-being of farmers as they received large benefits from plundering. In addition, 
plunder was seen as a common pool resource available for exploitation by the various bands. As it 
were, roving bandits did not undertake any investments in public goods that would have improved the 
well-being of the villagers and increase production. Over time, however, the regime of roving banditary 
was not sustainable which gave rise to stationary banditary. These  were bandits who settled in the 
villages and monopolized rent extraction. In this case, plunder was no longer a common pool resource. 
Stationary bandits therefore had an interest in good economic performance (higher output) because 
they stood to reap those benefits. Thus, stationary bandits have an incentive to provide public goods 
such as a legal system, security, et. at levels that are beneficial for the economy in general. Here, 
encompassing interests results in cooperation that enhances public provision.  
 The logic of the roving and stationary bandits can be extended to explain governance in 
ethnically fractionalized societies (Meagher 2003). First, of course is that the quality of governance will 
depend on the extent of cooperation among the various social factions. More efficient governance 
structures will emerge where the various factions cooperate, where their shares of any inefficiencies or 
losses imposed by government are closer to equal, and where the number of such factions is small. 
Second, in the case of public good provision, the likelihood of a majority ethnic group engaging in 
inefficient distribution to itself or disinvestment in public good rises as the group’s exclusive hold on 
power erodes. That is when one or more minority groups grows in number and voice posing a threat 
to the dominant group’s hold on power and resources (Alesina et. al 1997; Batancourt and Gleason 
1998).  As noted by Meagher (2003), the analysis provides some idea as to the potential for 
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cooperation in plural societies based on relative size and power of factions in the polity. Very small and 
relatively invisible minorities pose no dilemma of cooperation to the majority, perhaps because the 
former are too small to bear all the costs of governance inefficiencies. Factions of equal size and 
inclusiveness are forced to negotiate a framework of coordination to meet shared objectives.   
An explanation as to why ethnicity may influence collective action and which reduces 
cooperation is that ethnic groups behave much like special interest groups. The interest-group theory 
of government as applied to ethnic groups assumes that ethnic groups seek to maximize the welfare of 
their members at the expense of others. Like other interest groups such as labor unions or producer 
groups, ethnic groups necessarily adopt strategies that give them an advantage in influencing policy 
decisions.  The most efficient way for ethnic groups to influence policy is to capture the means of 
wealth transfers (that is the government). Kimenyi (1987) attributes the intense ethnic competition for 
political power as one of the outcomes of interest-group behavior. Unlike other interest groups, 
however, ethnic interest are more durable since exit and entry into such groups is limited. Thus, ethnic 
groups form what are referred to as ‘permanent interest groups’ (Kimenyi 1987). Competition amongst 
permanent interest groups can be expected to be more intense and continous than is the case with 
other interest groups. Such competition has implications on provision of public goods. 
The interest-group theory of government can help explain a number of outcomes in ethnically 
divided countries. First of course is that there will be a tendency for the ethnic groups in power to 
transfer higher benefits to members of their group. In the case of public goods, it can be expected that 
ethnic groups that control the government will adopt those strategies that make it difficult for other 
groups to capture the instruments of wealth transfers. Not surprisingly, the competition to control the 
instruments of wealth transfers has been intense in most African countries and has been one of the 
underlying causes of ethnic conflicts. This analysis helps explain at least in part, the continued state of 
conflict and political instability in Africa where there are many ethnic groups that attempt to control 
 9 
governments. Of course such competition and ensuing conflicts impact on economic performance and 
also government provision. 
Another governance outcome that is associated with ethnicity is corruption. A common 
example of how ethnic fractionalization associates with corruption relates to patronage and nepotism 
in the public sector.  Patronage and nepotism refer to the situation of extending benefits to members 
of one’s family, friends, or ethnic group while discriminating other people who are considered 
outsiders.  In Africa, the most common form of corruption entails the distribution of rewards, jobs, 
contracts, and promotions, on the basis of ethnicity.  Horowitz (1994) notes that, “in severely divided 
societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be 
excluded…  In ethnic politics, Inclusion may affect the distribution of important material and non 
material goods, including the prestige of the various ethnic groups and the identity of the state as 
belonging more to one group than another.”(p.35). 
 Preferential treatment of members of one’s ethnic group may primarily be a strategy to buy 
stability.  Many African countries are under autocratic or semi autocratic rule.  In these types of 
systems, stability of the government largely depends on maintaining a small supporting coalition intact.  
In other words, stability requires that the sharing coalition be small as possible.  Members of other 
ethnic groups have the desire to remove the ruler in power and replace him with a member of their 
own ethnic group.  Stability is therefore, a primary concern to leaders in ethnically divided societies and 
rulers must therefore surround themselves with trusted members of their own ethnic group.  Brough 
and Kimenyi (1986) present a model that explains the tendency of rulers to recruit bureaucrats 
primarily from their own ethnic group.  In this model, a ruler can increase the efficiency of the 
bureaucracy by appointing individuals from all the ethnic groups with the primary criteria being their 
competency. But such hiring practices that include members of other ethnic groups weaken the ruling 
coalition as benefits of the regime are shared by all ethnic groups.  The result is that, by seeking to be 
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efficient, the regimes risk instability.  Thus, a leader faces the tradeoff between efficiency and stability.  
Since the most important objective of rulers is to maximize their tenure in office, then they almost 
always must recruit disproportionately from their ethnic groups in order to maintain the supporting 
coalition intact. 
Figure 1 shows the choice facing a ruler of a country that has many ethnic factions.  The 
horizontal axis shows the percentage of senior civil servants who belong to other ethnic groups other 
than the ruler’s ethnic group.  The vertical axis measures regime stability.  The concave curve, SE,  
shows the trade-off between stability and hiring from outside the ruler’s ethnic group.  In this model, 
the higher levels of stability are achieved when top civil servants are primarily from the ruler’s own 
ethnic group.  As more and more senior servants are recruited outside the supporting coalition, 
stability decreases.  The general assumption is that such hiring dilutes the benefits of the supporting 
coalition. 
The percentage of senior civil servants from outside, the rulers ethnic group is determined by 
the tangency between the ruler's highest indifference curve and the trade-off between stability and 
members of other ethnic groups hired.  By and large, given the desire to remain in power, leaders will 
tend to employ members of their own group so as to maintain the ruling coalition intact.4 
 More recently, Kimenyi (1997) compared ethnic groups to firms that organize for production.  
Each ethnic group can be considered as a monopolist faced with a downward sloping demand curve 
and an upward sloping marginal cost of producing “ethnic” goods.  Efficient production increases the 
producer and consumer surplus which essentially is a measure of an ethnic group’s well being.  As can 
be expected, ethnic groups within the same country are likely to be vastly different in terms of their 
ability to generate surplus.  Each ethnic group can increase its ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ surplus by entering 
                                                 
4 As will be seen later, this means that there is a preference for patronage goods at the expense of non-excludable 
goods. 
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into mutually beneficial exchange with other ethnic groups.  Thus, under conditions whereby ethnic 
groups are able to freely organize production and enter into market exchange with other groups, each 
ethnic group would seek to be efficient in production in order to increase its surplus. But efficiency in 
production is not the only way that an ethnic group can increase its surplus.  One attractive alternative 
is to use the political process to capture the surplus generated by other groups.  Under a system of 
government where taxing and spending decisions are centralized, then rulers are able to redistribute 
surplus from some ethnic groups to others.  Given the fact that ethnic groups occupy different 
regions, governments are able to direct the resources to specific groups.  Thus, we can expect leaders 
to allocate relatively larger shares of public resources to areas where members of their ethnic groups 
live. 
A system of redistributing benefits from some groups to others could result in a number of 
governance issues.  For one, groups that are taxpayers have an incentive to under-report and conceal 
their earnings.   In other words, ethnicity could impact on tax compliance and consequently on public 
provision. Public goods are of course financed by taxes and therefore, tax compliance is an important 
factor in determining provision of public goods. A determinant of the extent of tax compliance is the 
degree of trust and cohesiveness in society.  By and large, low trust societies are characterized by 
markedly lower levels of tax compliance than high trust societies. Experimental evidence from Social 
and Political Psychology has established that the level of trust and the degree of trustworthiness 
decreases with ethnic diversity (Zucker, 1986; Tyler, 1998; Glaeser et al., 2000; Alesina and Ferrara, 
2002).  Further experimental evidence has established that tax compliance increases with trust (Scholz 
and Pinney, 1995; scholz and Lubell, 1998a, b; Scholz, 1998). The argument given is that people are 
willing to comply if they know that everyone else complies. If people do not trust others to comply, 
they choose to evade taxes themselves. 
 12 
Tax compliance could be affected by ethnic fragmentation through social sanctions or norms. 
Olson (1965) argues that social sanctions can provide ‘selective incentives,’ in facilitating public goods 
provision and, therefore, as noted by Roth, Scholz and Witte (1989), social stigma associated with non-
compliance could improve compliance. For social sanctions to be effective, however, it is important 
that individuals are affected by such sanctions. To the extent that individuals are affected mainly by 
social sanctions exercised by their own ethnic group, such sanctions will not be as effective in 
ethnically fragmented communities as in more homogeneous communities (Lassen, 2003).   
Levi (1988) argues that voluntary tax compliance will occur only when taxpayers have confidence 
that rulers will keep their bargain and that other constituents will keep theirs. Taxpayers are strategic 
actors who will cooperate only when they can expect others to cooperate as well. Thus, the compliance 
of each depends on the compliance of others. Levi observes that voluntary tax compliance is 
influenced by two by social contracts. The horizontal contract (which concerns the perceived fairness 
of the tax payment) and vertical contract (which concerns what has been called the quid pro quo of 
taxation).  Tax compliance largely depends on two issues: First is  whether taxpayers get sufficient 
public goods in exchange for taxes paid.  This is sometimes referred to as exchange equity (Spicer and 
Lundstedt, 1976). Second issue is whether taxpayers get the public goods mix they prefer.  If taxpayers 
do not consider the benefits they get as comparable to the tax burden they bear, they will then tend to 
reduce their tax compliance. To the extent that leaders tend to allocate relatively more public resources 
to members of their ethnic group, it can be expected that other communities react by lowering their 
tax compliance.  A secondary result is of course that overall tax revenue collections decline and thus 
the quality of public provision declines in ethnically fragmented societies. 
Empirical evidence shows that public goods provision and participation is lower in ethnically 
fragmented societies (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Miguel, 2001). 
The possible reasons suggested are that different ethnic groups may prefer different public goods 
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mixes and, further, that people may not want to contribute to public goods benefiting other ethnic 
groups. Alesina et al. (1999) argue that the lower provision is determined through the political process, 
as tax payers exercise their voice option. Another way through which groups can express their 
discontent is to use the exit option. When taxpayers feel that the public goods mix provided is much 
different from what they would have preferred themselves, or that the goods benefit people with 
whom they do not identify or that the rate of transformation is low due to pervasive corruption with 
much rents being appropriated by public officials and politicians, then the attractiveness of the quid 
pro quo contract is diminished, and there by lowering voluntary compliance to the tax code. 
 Ethnic groups also organize for the provision of public goods to their members. We have 
noted that individuals identify strongly with particular groups. For example, ethnic identification in 
politics is revealed by the patterns of voting. No matter which country one looks at, it has become 
clear that people vote very much on ethnic lines, and political ideology in the western sense rarely plays 
a significant role. The fact that we observe high degrees of ethnic identification implies that the 
expected benefits of identifying with a tribal group exceed the costs of such identification. One such 
benefit is the self-provision of public goods. 
 The strong ties within ethnic groups makes such groups ideally suited as units of collective 
choice that organize for public goods provision. This is because ethnicity economizes on 
organizational costs. In particular ethnic based institutions have a comparative advantage in solving 
prisoner's dilemma problems. Because members of an ethnic groups have a long-term attachment to 
their groups (for example, through blood or past memories), they are more likely to have continuos 
dealings with members of their ethnic group than with members of other ethnic groups. Continuous 
dealing reduces cheating in prisoner's dilemma situations and as a result ethnic groups may be more 
efficient in the provision of public goods than the state (Roback 1991). Simply put, within an ethnic 
group, cooperation is easier to elicit than when more groups are involved. The free-rider problem is 
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likely to be less prevalent when the group is made up of one ethnic group than when several ethnic 
groups are involved.  It is because of this reason that, by and large, voluntary associations in Africa 
almost always form along ethnic lines.  In essence, ethnic groups are analogous to clubs. 
Kimenyi (1998) extends the club model to ethnic provision of public goods. In the theory of 
clubs, individuals with similar or closely related  interests cooperate in the provision of excludable 
public goods--club goods. Kimenyi compares ethnic groups to voluntary associations or clubs whose 
members have fairly homogenous preferences. Following the model of clubs as developed by 
Buchanan (1965), the optimal size of the club is determined by the membership at which marginal cost 
is equal to marginal benefit. In this model, the costs and benefits increase and decrease steadily as 
membership increases.  Based on previous discussion, organizing collective activities by one ethnic 
group is expected to resemble the club model where costs and benefits increase and decrease steadily 
as membership increases (Figure 2). This is because the ethnic group possesses various advantages that 
economize on organizational costs  (Landa 1994). 
 The benefits and costs change more dramatically when more than one ethnic group is 
involved (Figure 3 and 4). Organizing across different ethnic groups is more complicated and adding 
members from other ethnic groups creates a discontinuity in the costs and benefits. Such 
discontinuities result from difficulties in communicating across ethnic and linguistic boundaries and 
also because of differences in preferences, taste, and also because of the fact there is less trust across 
ethnic groups than within the same ethnic group.  The implication of this club model is that ethnic 
groups may be suited to organize for the production of local public goods. 
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), in their analysis of multi-ethnic societies argue that ethnic 
salience can result in “ethnicization of collectively provided goods” in the sense that the political 
process allocates excludable public goods and transfers based on ethnic characteristics (favouritism). 
The failure of the state to insure nonexcludability make individuals turn to their ethnic communities, as 
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a sort of alternative statehoods, for the provision of public goods and this process can initiate a vicious 
cycle in which ethnic communalism breeds attitudes of illegitimacy, which in turn reduce the 
effectiveness of the state, and further intensify attitudes of illegitimacy. 
In summary, the foregoing discussion highlights various ways through which ethnicity may 
impact on the provision of public goods. The next section looks at specific on how ethnic 
fractionalization impacts on public provision. 
 
III. Ethnic Fractionalization and Public Goods 
Simple Model of Public Provision 
Ethnic groups can impact on the provision of public goods in a number of ways. First, the foregoing 
discussion suggests that there may be systematic differences in the preferences for the quantity and 
type of public goods. The implication of differences in preferences across ethnic groups is that the 
choice of quantity and mix of public goods can be expected to vary depending on the ethnic 
composition of the population. This suggests that ethnic heterogeneity creates some conflict in the 
choice of public goods in the community. Second, ethnic groups do behave much like special interest 
groups that seek transfers from other groups. Interest-group behavior can impact the provision of 
public goods as rulers favour members of their ethnic group. Third, ethnicity tends to undermine tax 
compliance. Finally, the ethnic group is an important institution that economizes on the costs of 
achieving cooperative solutions in prisoner’s dilemma situations.  This means that ethnic groups can 
self-provide goods efficiently. Below, we discuss some of the expected outcomes in public provision 
given these theoretical foundations. 
 Consider a community with a population normalized at 1. For simplicity, we assume that there is 
no entry or exit in or out of the community. The community provides public goods that are financed 
entirely by taxes and there are no transfers from other communities or governments.  For a public 
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good g, the voter preferences are single peaked in terms of levels of spending.5 Members of the 
community use majority rule to decide first on the level of taxation and then on the type and quantity 
of public good. Given these assumption, the most preferred choice is one represented by the median 
voter (Black 1958). To simplify the analysis, we assume that individuals in this community receive 
exogenous income Y which is assumed to be the same for all members of the community.6 Thus, the 
disposable income for members of the community y is Y-t.  
 To illustrate the impact of ethnicity on the provision of public goods, we start by presenting a 
simple model of public goods provision as in  Alesina and Easterly (1998).  The utility of members in 
this community can be generally expressed as U=U(g, c), where c is private consumption. For an 
individual’s disposable income y, then c= (y-t). The public budget constraint is g=t. Because  g  is 
chosen through a preference aggregation process, the utility from g to individual i depends very much 
on the individual’s preferences relative to that of the median voter.  
 Following Alesina and Easterly , individual preferences are as expressed as 
        1.        Ui = ga (I-li) + y-g 
where li is the preference distance between individual i’s most preferred public good and the actual 
public good. That is, the distance from the median voter preference.  Individual i’s preferred choice of 
the size of the public good is obtained by solving 
2. Max Ui = ga (1-li) y-g   which yields (3) 
3. gi* = [a(1-li)]1/(1-a) 
 If we define l1m as the median distance from the type most preferred by the median voter, the amount 
of public good provided in equilibrium is given by: 
4.   g* = [a(1-lim)]1/(1-a) 
                                                 
5 Single peaked preferences simplify the analysis as majority cycling is avoided. 
6 The assumption of equal income helps in isolating differences in incomes associated with income. By assuming 
same income, we are left with differences in preferences only due to ethnicity. 
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Provision of Non-excludable goods 
From the result in equation 4, it is possible to draw some conclusion relating to the public provision 
and population characteristics. First, it is evident that the equilibrium amount of public good provided 
decreases with the median distance from the median. Given that individual first vote on the amount of 
tax, the larger the median distance from the median voter, the lower the level of g. In other words, in 
communities with widely varying preferences, individuals will prefer lower taxes (smaller quantities of 
public goods) and instead devote more resources to private consumption. 
 Figure 5 depicts preferences of particular public goods by different ethnic groups, Ea Eb Ec and Ed. 
These are the quantities of public goods that the different ethnic groups would prefer.  Consider a case 
where there are only two ethnic groups, Ea and Eb. The preferences of the two groups are very 
different with Ea preferring a much lower level of g whereas Eb prefers a much larger quantity. In this 
polarized community, the “median distance from the median” is large. Public provision in the society 
is likely to result in outcomes that are sub-optimal from the perspective of each of the groups. The 
tendency then would for the ethnic groups to opt for lower taxes and thus lower amounts of the non-
excludable good. On the other hand, a community comprised of only Ec and Ed is likely to have higher 
quantities of public good as the median distance from the median is relatively small as compared to the 
case of Ea and Eb. In other words, c and d are likely to agree on the quantities of the public good to be 
provided. 
 Ethnic conflicts over the provision of public goods could arise from the fact that different ethnic 
groups live in different territories within the same country  as discussed earlier.  In this case, the 
benefits of a public good vary across ethnic groups. Thus, ethnic groups are likely to oppose provision 
of public goods whose benefit largely accrues to others. The basic conclusion is that ethnic 
fragmentation lowers the amount of resources devoted to non-excludable public goods. 
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Patronage goods 
Previous discussion highlighted the interest-group behavior of ethnic groups. Ethnic groups compete 
to control the state in order to transfer benefits to members of their group. To the extent that non-
excludable goods are likely to benefit all groups, they are not suitable vehicles to concentrate benefits 
on any one particular group. Thus, governments in ethnically fractionalized societies are likely to 
reduce spending on non-excludable goods and instead allocate more resources to “excludable” goods 
that can be targeted to particular groups or individuals. A good example of such spending is on public 
employment of members of a particular ethnic groups or targeted transfers to members of a 
community. We refer to these targeted benefits as patronage goods (Kimenyi and Shughart 1989; 
Alesina and Easterly 1998). 
 Let total spending G be composed of two goods-g1, non-excludable goods and g2, patronage 
goods. Provision of g1 benefits all ethnic groups while g2 benefits only selected grops. The ratio 
g1/(g1+g2) will therefore vary with the degree of ethnic polarization. The more polarized the society, the 
higher the share of g2. In other words, polarization leads to a reduction in the share of non-excludable 
public goods to the total spending. 
 
Ethnic Provision of “club goods” 
The foregoing discussion points to inefficiencies in the provision of public goods arising from ethnic 
fractionalization. But the previous discussion also demonstrated that ethnic groups are important 
institutions that reduce the transaction costs of reaching cooperative outcomes. In other words, ethnic 
groups have advantage in solving prisoner’s dilemma situations that otherwise complicate collective 
provision.  At one level, ethnic provision of public goods is the result of marginalization by a dominant 
group.  At another level, ethnic provision is desirable because  the cost of organizing collective 
provision increases rapidly as more ethnic groups are involved. In essence, as cooperation weakens, 
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public provision deteriorates. Another way of looking at this is the situation where ethnic preferences 
for a public good are quite different as shown in Figure 6. In this case, the two ethnic group’s 
preferences are represented by A and B with a bimodal distribution, The median voter outcomes for 
the two are A* and B*.   Given this distribution of preferences, decentralized provision would be best 
for the two groups. 
 
 Evidence 
Some of the more comprehensive studies on how ethnic groups impact on public provision have 
focused on blacks and whites in the United States of America. Earlier studies focused on the provision 
of education and particularly the impact of while flight.7   One of the triggers for  white flight was in 
the South following the striking down of dejure segregation following the Brown Versus Board of Education  
decision in 1954.  In this landmark court case, the Supreme Court of the United States declared that 
separate education facilities were inherently unequal and thus made racial segregation illegal.8 During 
the era of segregation, whites and blacks attended different public schools. Nevertheless, those 
attended by blacks were largely inferior—poorly funded and poorly trained teachers, infrastructure, etc.  
In this case, public provision varied across the ethnic groups purely because of racial discrimination.  
After the High Court ruled against the segregationists, whites exited from public schools in large 
numbers and joined private schools. The while flight was particularly evident in those localities that 
had higher populations of blacks  (Conlon and Kimenyi 1990 ). Given that whites were also the ones 
primarily making decision on resource allocation, one of the outcome of white flight was a marked 
reduction in funding of public schools generally. The other wave of white flight was triggered by the 
                                                 
7 White flight is used to refer to the wholesale migration of whites in communities or schools as the population 
of blacks increases. 
8 The idea of “separate and Equal” was entrenched following the Plessy V. Fergusin decision by the Supreme 
Court in 1896.  
 20 
migration of blacks into the urban centers from rural south. As more blacks moved in, whites exited 
into the suburbs. There was again subsequent deterioration in the quality of public provision in urban 
centers populated by blacks. To a large extent, the differences in public goods following white flight 
were largely the result of a diminished tax base due to low incomes but also because of reduced 
transfer to these localities.   
 More recent studies show that ethnic diversity impacts on the provision of public goods in the 
United States. Alesina, Bagur and Easterly (1999), find that higher levels of ethnic diversity associate 
with low levels of provision of public goods across U.S. Municipalities. Specifically, they find that high 
levels of ethnic diversity are associated with up to 25% lower funding for public schools. Below, we 
provide evidence that links ethnicity to public goods provision in Africa. 
 
Provision of non-excludable public goods and Patronage goods 
Unfortunately, there are not many empirical studies that have focused specifically on the impact of 
ethnicity on provision of public goods in Africa. The evidence available is basically of two types. The 
first looks directly at the impact of ethnic diversity on a particular public good such as education. The 
second approach looks at how ethnicity influences the allocation of public resources. 
 In a study on the impact of ethnic diversity on school funding by communities in Western Kenya, 
Migue (2000), finds that higher levels of local ethnic diversity to be associated with sharply lower 
primary school funding and much poorer school facilities. The community studied by Miguel is in 
Busia and Teso Districts and is ethnically diverse with 67% of the population being Luhya, 26% Teso 
and 5% Luo. Figure 7 shows what happens to school funding as the population mix changes. As is 
evident, the level of funding is much higher when the communities are homogeneous and lowest when 
the communities are of almost ethnically diverse. This evidence is quite consistent to the theoretical 
proposition that ethnic diversity will result in lower funding of public goods. Miguel concludes that: 
 21 
Ethnic diversity is associated with sharply lower local school funding and worse school 
facilities in rural Western Kenyan primary schools. Ethnic diversity across tribes rather than 
across subtribes appears to be driving this negative relationship, suggesting that collective 
action problems may be more severe in the presence of greater cultural and linguistic 
differences. Donations from local fundraisers (harambees)—events that require considerable 
community coordination and participation to be successful—are sharply lower in ethnically 
diverse areas. Given the central role that harambees play in Kenya local public finance, the 
results of this paper suggest that local ethnic diversity may be negatively associated with the 
provision of other local public goods in Kenya (p. 30). 
 
The discussion in the previous section alluded to the fact that one of the key issues is that leaders 
in ethnically heterogeneous societies tend to allocate relatively more of a nations resources to regions 
where members of their ethnic group reside.  Brockerhoff and Hewett (1998) investigate whether 
dominance of national political authority (by an ethnic group) confers advantages to members of the 
ethnic group. The authors mainly make use of data from demographic and health surveys (DHS) 
between 1990 and 1995. They begin with the premise that members of ethnic groups enjoy more 
favorable conditions even outside urban areas as a result of nonrandom placement of resources or 
uneven economic development patterns among the groups. They conclude that the dominant elite may 
have channeled scarce state resources to areas where members of their ethnic groups are concentrated. 
Table 1 shows the leadership of  a number of  African states focusing on ethnic political 
dominance. The selected states are relatively stable and have had prolonged periods of political 
dominance by one or two ethnic communities.  The purpose is to investigate the extent to which 
political dominance by an ethnic group influences public resource allocation. By and large, for the 11 
selected countries results show public provision is significantly higher among groups that have had 
high-level government representation than among other groups for example in terms of road 
infrastructure, access to public health services and education (Tables 2 and 3).   In Mali, Niger and 
Senegal, for example,  complete immunization coverage is significantly higher among groups that have 
had high-level government representation than among other groups. Among the Serer of Senegal a 20 
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percent survival disadvantage around 1970 was reversed to a 20 percent advantage by around 1990. 
This is despite the fact that the Serer are disproportionately concentrated in rural areas of Senegal 
(Pison et al 1995). In rural Senegal, the median distance to a health facility is 34km for Serers as 
compared to an average distance of 61.9 km for other ethnic groups.  The Bambara and Djerma-
Songhai are much more likely than others to live in rural communities that are served by all weather 
surfaces and in Ghana, 84 percent of Ashanti received some education, as compared to about 60 
percent of others ethnic groups. In Niger, women who belong to the Djerma and Songhai are twice as 
likely to have attended school, as are other women. Similar advantages are noticeable among groups 
that have dominated political leadership such as the Baoule of Cote d’Ivore, Kikuyu of Kenya and the 
Bemba of Zambia.  Other evidence show that, in Kenya the Kalenjins enjoyed a decline (in child 
mortality) of 37 percent between cohorts 1978-82 and 1983-87, coinciding with Moi’s consolidation of 
power (Ungar, 1986). Child mortality levels of the Kikuyu were at par with those of many 
industrialized countries of the North by the 1980’s (UNICEF, 1997). The under five mortality rate 
during 1989-93 was 36.1 for the Kikuyu and 125.1 for the non-Kikuyu in Kenya.   
 Kenya is a good example of how rulers serve ethnic interests through patronage goods.  Since 
independence, Kenya has had only three presidents: Jomo Kenyatta, who ruled from 1963 until his 
death in 1978;  Daniel Arap Moi who ruled from 1978 to December 2002, and Mwai Kibaki who 
became President in 2002.  The First two presidents came from different ethnic groups each having a 
different support base.  The evidence available, strongly supports the idea that resource allocation in 
Kenya has been determined more by political and ethnic consideration than by actual needs of the 
population or established criteria of economic efficiency.  Likewise, the appointment of senior civil 
servants is largely influenced by ethnicity. 
 During Kenyatta’s era, the Kenyan cabinet was relatively small, but his ethnic group was over 
represented.  This was also true for all senior civil servants, police force and the military.  Upon taking 
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power, President Moi increased the number of cabinet positions and the civil service awarding the 
positions to members of his ethnic group and other ethnic groups from his home province.  At the 
same time, he deliberately removed members of the cabinet and senior civil servants belonging to 
Kenyatta’s ethnic group.  Within a relatively short period of time, Moi had been able to totally change 
the ethnic representation of the cabinet and the bureaucracy.  Accompanying these changes, 
government spending increased rapidly as the new President made concerted efforts to distribute 
benefits to members of his ethnic group and pay the bloated civil service.  Table 4 shows the change in 
the composition of the Kenyan cabinet following Moi’s rise to the presidency.  The evidence here 
again supports the previous discussion that rulers in Africa award senior positions to primarily, 
members of their own ethnic group. This is a clear example of provision of patronage goods. Likewise, 
the case of Burundi where the Tusti are dominated politics clearly reveals similar trends.  Despite the 
fact that the Hutus are the majority, they are hold few positions in the civil service of that country 
(Table 5 and6 6).  This evidence points to the fact hat allocation of excludable public goods is 
influenced significantly by ethnic dominance in political leadership. 
 
Ethnic Self-Provision of Public Goods 
The discussion above shows that in ethnically fractionalized societies, we can expect a bias against 
provision of non-excludable goods in favor of patronage goods. Governments intervene to extract 
resources but only transfer to select individuals or communities. Because of the vacuum so left by the 
state, ethnic groups organize to provide themselves with public goods. This is consistent with the idea 
of absent-present state advanced by (Reddy 2001). 
 Reddy (2001, p. 296) argues that there is a “link between constructions of ethnic identities and the 
ideology and character of authoritarian, despotic or oppressive states.” Such states are usually both 
absent and present. At one level, they “are highly intrusive and extractive. At another level, these states 
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are absent, failing to supply adequate or any welfare benefits, health, education, protection, justice, 
national identity and so on.” Such state absence forces individuals to rely on their ethnic groups for 
essential public goods and services (e.g., protection of self and property; education , health care; etc.). 
 In a country with a fully functioning democratic and representative government, local interests are 
articulated at the national level by elected representatives. However, in authoritarian one-party and 
military regimes, such as those that emerged in the African countries in the 1960s and 1970s, ethnic 
organizations, particularly the “home town” associations came to represent the main (and in some 
cases, the only) instrument for the articulation of local interests. These voluntary organizations not 
only came to represent an important conduit through which local objectives were articulated at the 
national level, but also served as the primary development agency for many villages and regions in the 
African countries. In fact, it was through such organizations that Africans in the urban areas and the 
Diaspora contributed to development in their villages and regions of origin. In the process, the home 
town association has had a significant impact on governance and the allocation of resources in many 
African countries.  
  In most African countries, home town associations are voluntary organizations designed to 
provide mutual benefits for their members. In Cameroon and Nigeria, for example, hometown 
associations have been formed by urban residents and those in the Diaspora (notably in the United 
States and Western Europe) for the promotion of social and economic development in their 
“ancestral” regions. In fact, through these organizations many “sons and daughters” of several villages 
in Cameroon currently living in the Diaspora have been able to provide health care, educational and 
water facilities for their kin back home. According to Barkan, McNulty and Ayeni (1991, p. 462), home 
town associations in Côte d’Ivoire have provided 
An array of basic services to residents of local communities—primarily and especially 
secondary schools; medical services through the construction and staffing of health clinics and 
even hospitals, electricity and telephone lines through the installation of utility poles, roads, 
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public meeting halls, and postal services through the construction of the necessary 
infrastructure. 
 
Schools, medical facilities, public utilities, and roads are all social overhead capital that should be 
provided by the government. However, in the case where the state is absent, many ethnic-based 
nongovernmental organizations have stepped in to provide these critical infrastructures. As argued by 
Reddy (2001), ethnic-based associations were very critical to the survival of blacks under the apartheid 
regime, which came into being in South Africa in 1948. Where the state refused to provide essential 
services to the people, ethnic associations stepped in to feel the void. In the case where the state 
provided inferior services or those that were considered detrimental to the welfare of the black 
population (e.g., medical services provided by poorly trained personnel; education designed to prevent 
blacks from acquiring the skills they needed to become competitive with whites in the labor force, 
etc.), ethnic associations quite often came to the rescue and established structures for the provision of 
alternative services. 
 Many of these ethnic-based associations usually have broad mandates, with social and economic 
development, including the provision of essential social services (which, ordinarily are provided by the 
government), as their main focus. However, the nature and kinds of activities that these organizations 
engage in is determined, to a large extent, by the nature of government provision. In some African 
countries where the ruling party uses public provision to gain votes and maintain its hold on power, 
ethnic groups and regions that support the opposition are deprived of essential public services, 
including social overhead capital for development. Many of these associations provide water, health 
care, education (especially at the primary level), HIV/AIDS prevention instruction, including the 
distribution of condoms, and other services, which are usually the purview of formal government.  
 
IV. Conclusion: Proposals for research  
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The general message of this paper is that ethnic diversity influences the provision of public goods.  
Theory points to the fact that ethnic fragmentation largely results in under provision of public goods.  
Such under provision can in turn lead to underdevelopment.  Unfortunately there is only limited 
research that have empirically looked at how ethnicity impacts on public provision.  A number of 
research issues are proposed for additional research. 
(a). Economics of Ethnic institutions:  A lot of discussions on ethnic groups lack systematically articulated 
theoretical foundations of the behaviour  and organization of such groups.   One area of research that 
could help improve the understanding of outcomes in ethnically fragmented countries is to model 
ethnic groups as institutions for collective action.  In other words, such research should be able to 
provide clear insights of the behaviour of ethnic groups and expected outcomes under different 
environments. 
(b).  Empirical evidence of public goods provision:  As observed previously, empirical evidence on ow ethnicity 
impacts on public goods provision is scarce.  This is a fruitful area of research that could add value to 
the current understanding of  ethnicity.   
( c ). Tax Compliance:  Theory points to low tax compliance in ethnically fragmented societies.  
However, there is limited evidence to support such assertions.  Cross country and cross community 
studies could shed some light on how ax compliance is impacted on by ethnic diversity. 
(d). Institutional Reforms:  The implication of the results reported in this paper is that ethnic 
fragmentation is not good for development.  It lowers trust, tax compliance, is associated with ethnic 
rent-seking, inefficient wealth transfers and an overall under-provision of public goods.  But ethnic 
heterogeneity I a given and cannot be wished away. The issue then is to study institutional reforms that  
could reduce the adverse consequences of ethnicity. 
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Figure 1: Ethnicity, stability and efficiency 
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Figure 2: Optimal size of a club 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Ethnicity and collective provision 
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Figure 4: Ethnicity and collective provision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Preferences for a public good by different ethnic groups 
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Figure 6: Preferences for a public good by two ethnic groups 
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 Table 1: Dominant ethnic groups in 11 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Country              Ethnic             Percent on              Head of state from  
                             Group               National                   Ethnic Group 
                                                    Population                            
Central African   M’baka                  7                     1966-79 (Bokasa) 
   Republic          Yakoma                  8                    1980-93 (Kolingba) 
 
Cote d’Ivore      Baoule                    20                   1960-1999  
                                                                                   (Houphouet-Boigny ; Bedie) 
 
Ghana                Ashanti                   28                   1969-79 (Several) 
                                                                                 1982- 2001 (Rawlings)* 
 
Kenya                Kikuyu                    21                  1963-1978 (Kenyatta) 
                          Kalenjin                  11                   1978-2002 (Moi)    
              
Mali                   Bambara                 31                  1968-91 (Traore) 
 
 
Namibia            Ovambo                  46                  1990- present (Nujoma) 
 
Niger                 Djerma-Songhai     24                  1960-93 (Lule; Binaira) 
 
Rwanda             Hutu                       90                  1962-94 (Kayibanda; Habyarimana) 
 
Senegal              Serer                      19                  1960- present (Senghor; Diouf) 
 
Uganda             Baganda                  16                  1979 (Lule; Binaira) 
 
Zambia             Bemba                     15                   1964-91 (Kaunda) 
*Rawlings is non-Ashanti; his wife is a member of the Ashanti royal family. 
Source: Brockerhoff and Hewett (1998) (attributed to Morrisson, Mitchell and Paden 1989). Note that 
a few changes were made in the table to make it current. 
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Table 2: Characteristics of ethnic groups in 11 countries (in percent)a 
                                                            Women                                Children Received 
Country and                                      Attended                               Complete 
Survey year                                         School                                   Immunizationb 
Central African republic 1994/95      
Yakoma                                                   71.3**                                        63.3** 
M’baka                                                    67.9**                                        37.7 
All other                                                  44.5                                           36.4 
Cote d’Ivore, 1994  
Baoule                                                     49.5**                                         46.3** 
All other                                                  39.0                                           34.8 
Ghana, 1993              
Ashanti                                                   84.1**                                         60.8** 
All other                                                 60.4                                            49.7 
Kenya, 1993                                         
Kikuyu                                                    90.5**                                         89.2** 
Kalenjin                                                  80.1                                            72.9 
All other                                                  80.7                                           70.7 
Mali, 1995/96     
Bambara                                                 20.6*                                           37.8** 
All other                                                18.0                                             31.3 
Namibia, 1992 
Ovambo                                                 88.2**                                         60.3**                         
European                                               97.2**                                          61.4** 
All other                                                78.4                                             46.9 
Niger, 19992 
Djerma-Songhai                                   16.8**                                           22.8** 
All other                                                8.9                                               13.9 
Rwanda, 1992 
Hutu                                                      60.3*                                           78.3* 
Tutsi                                                      80.2**                                          84.9 
Senegal, 1992,1993 
Serer                                                      25.3                                             63.4**  
All other                                                26.9                                             49.0 
Uganda, 1995                
Baganda                                                95.1**                                          62.5** 
All other                                               64.3                                             49.3 
Zambia, 1992  
Bemba                                                  89.0**                                           65.4 
All other                                               81.0                                              64.5 
 
01.0*,*05.0* ≤≤ pp  
aStatistics are derived from women ages 15-49. bBased on children ages12-59 months. Received BCG, 
measles, DPT 1-3, and polio 1-3 immunisation.  
 
 37 
 
Table 3: Rural community characteristics of ethnic group members in six countries 
                                                                                                               Median Distance to 
                                                                          Percent with                                 Public health 
                                                                     All-Weather Road                            Facility (km.) 
Central African Republic, 1994/1995 
Yakoma                                                                     3.3*                                                  4.1*                           
M'baka                                                                    12.9**                                                 3.3** 
Other                                                                         1.3                                                    4.5 
 
Cote d'Ivore, 1994 
Baoule                                                                    41.6**                                                 3.9* 
Other                                                                      31.3                                                    4.5 
 
Kenya, 1993 
Kikuyu                                                                     __                                                   14.6** 
Kalenjin                                                                   __                                                   17.9* 
Other                                                                        __                                                   19.8 
 
Mali, 1995/1996 
Bambara                                                                  9.9**                                                49.2** 
Other                                                                       5.9                                                   62.5 
 
Niger, 1992 
Djerma-Songhai                                                   16.8*                                                  22.1*a 
Other                                                                      9.9                                                     13.0a 
   
Senegal, 1992/1993 
Serer                                                                     65.9**                                                   33.8** 
Other                                                                    47.8                                                      61.9 
 
01.0*,*05.0* ≤≤ pp  
aPercent living within 50 kilometres of a public health facility. 
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Table 4: Ethnicity and provision of patronage goods-Kenya 
 
 Last cabinet 
(Kenyatta) 
1978 
First cabinet 
(Moi) 
1982 
Second cabinet 
(Moi) 
1988 
 
Number of 
members 
 
 
22 
 
28 
 
34 
% of members of 
Kenyatta's cabinet 
retained 
- 35 14 
% of members of 
Kenyatta's tribe 
retained 
- 14 3 
 
 
Table 5: Burundi: ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN PUBLIC SECTOR CIVIL SERVICE POSTS 
IN 1997 
 Hutu Tutsi Twa 
Office of the president 1 98 0 
Central Committee of Single Party 2 50 0 
Administration of single party 3 52 0 
Ministers 5 13 0 
Cabinet directors 1 17 0 
Ministry Permanent Secretaries 0 40 0 
Province Governors 2 13 0 
Ambassadors 1 21 0 
Embassy Senior Diplomats 0 88 0 
Army Barrack Commanders 0 20 0 
Army Officers 2 398 0 
Army Sergeant and Privates 30 11970 0 
State Owned Companies Directors 5 252 0 
Hospital Directors 1 19 0 
University Lecturers 10 80 0 
Secondary Schools Directors and Inspectors 6 89 0 
Justice Prosecutors 0 66 0 
Magistrates 5 92 0 
Court Presidents 1 7 0 
Judiciary Police Officers and Inspectors 0 400 0 
Source: Ntibazonkiza, R. (1993) in http://www.dse.de/ef/business/nkurunzi.htm 
Note from the author suggest that the statistics may exaggerate the extent of Tutsi domination. 
Nevertheless the fact that the Tutsi dominate is unquestionable and, at the very least, this is the 
message the figures should convey. 
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Table 6: Burundi: ETHNIC AND REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MANAGERS OF PUBLIC 
CORPORATIONS 
ETHNIC 
GROUP 
 
REGION OF 
ORIGIN 
Tutsis Hutus Twa TOTAL 
Bururi province 60 3 0 63 
Remaining 14 
provinces 
29 8 0 37 
TOTAL 89 11 0 100 
Source: Raw data from ICG 
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